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THE “SOUND SCIENCE” AMENDMENT
TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
WHY IT FAILS TO RESOLVE THE
KLAMATH BASIN CONFLICT
James K. Hein*
Abstract: The conºict in the Klamath Basin has pitted irrigators against
environmentalists, tribes, and ªshermen in a dramatic battle over a
scarce resource: water. A 2001 court order allocated water to endan-
gered and threatened ªsh while irrigation ditches and farms went dry.
The incident became the rallying cry among those seeking to amend
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Legislators proposed the Sound
Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act to require that all
ESA decisions be based upon peer-reviewed, “sound” science. However,
as this Note att very white culturally.empts to explain, the amendment
would serve only to delay agency decisionmaking while providing more
opportunities for litigation, prolonging rather than helping the
embittered conºict in the Klamath Basin.
Introduction
The Klamath Basin, straddling the Oregon-California border, was
home to an epic battle over water during the drought of 2001.1 Down-
stream ªshermen and others successfully sued under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) of 1973 to halt federal irrigation deliveries to local
farmers in order to protect three listed species, the Lost River sucker,
the shortnose sucker, and the coho salmon.2 The result was a dramatic
battle that pitted irrigators and farmers against environmentalists, Na-
                                                                                                                     
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2004–05.
B.A., Clark Honors College, University of Oregon, 2002. I would like to thank Mr. Pease,
my high school English teacher, and Professor Bishop, my college mentor, without whose
inºuence this Note would not have been possible.
1 For an overview of the 2001 crisis and thoughtful suggestions as to the lessons to be
learned, see Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the
Klamath Basin, 30 Ecology L.Q. 279 (2003); see also Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and
Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 Tul. Envtl.
L.J. 197 (2002) (also providing background).
2 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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tive Americans, and ªshermen.3 A conºict affecting a sparsely popu-
lated region, the crisis nevertheless generated immense national at-
tention, reigniting long-standing debate over the merits of the ESA in
general. Speciªcally, the decisions of 2001 directly led to the proposal
of the Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of
2002 (Sound Science Act).4 This Note seeks to provide background to
the Klamath Basin conºict and an analysis of the Sound Science Act’s
likely consequences there.
Part I provides the setting, describing the basin and identifying
the key elements behind the controversy. Part II examines the Bureau
of Reclamation’s (Reclamation) consultations under the ESA with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries
Services (NMFS). It then considers the events leading up to the 2001
court order that halted irrigation deliveries and left farms dry. Part III
explores the developments of 2002 and 2003, in particular: the Na-
tional Research Council reports on FWS and NMFS’s science support-
ing the 2001 court order, Reclamation’s policy adjustment for the
Klamath Basin Project (Project) operations in 2002, and the ensuing
ªsh-kill in September 2002. Throughout the ªrst three Parts, the con-
troversy surrounding scientiªc reports and conclusions is discussed.
Finally, Part IV evaluates the Sound Science Act, a proposed
amendment to the ESA that attempts to resolve scientiªc controver-
sies by instructing agencies to rely only upon “sound science” in mak-
ing ESA determinations. After suggesting some of the Sound Science
Act’s likely consequences in the Klamath Basin, the Note concludes
that the Sound Science Act likely will serve only to delay agency deci-
sionmaking; give more inºuence to landowners, but not to other in-
terested parties; contribute to the volume of the basin’s litigation; and
serve to validate parties’ all-or-nothing approaches, at the expense of
any real solution through cooperation.
                                                                                                                     
3 See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1.
4 H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2002). That bill later stalled in Congress; a new version was
introduced in the House in 2003 and the Senate in 2004. S. 2009, 108th Cong. (2004);
H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003).
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Figure 1: The Klamath Basin and Klamath River5
I. Background
A. The Klamath Basin
The Iron Gate Dam, near the Oregon-California border, divides
the Klamath Basin and Klamath River into upper and lower portions.6
The Klamath River ºows southwest to the dam from the high-
elevation, dry Upper Klamath Basin in Oregon.7 Past the dam, the
Klamath continues southwest through temperate rainforest in Cali-
fornia’s lower Klamath Basin before emptying into the Paciªc Ocean.8
The largest body of water in the upper basin is Upper Klamath
Lake, home to the Lost River and shortnose suckers.9 Suckers lived
                                                                                                                     
5 Reprinted courtesy of the Oregon State University Extension Service.
6 Ron Hathaway & Teresa Welch, Background, in Water Allocation in the Klamath
Reclamation Project, 2001: An Assessment of Natural Resource, Economic, Social,
and Institutional Issues with a Focus on the Upper Klamath Basin 32 (William S.
Braunworth, Jr. et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter OSU Report], http://eesc.oregonstate.edu/
agcomwebªle/edmat/html/sr/sr1037/report.pdf.
7 Id. at 32 & ªg.1.
8 Id. at 32 ªg.1, 34.
9 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 32, 38–39.
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throughout the lakes, streams, and tributaries in the upper basin be-
fore irrigation signiªcantly reduced their habitat and populations
during the last century.10 Upper Klamath Lake also serves as the ba-
sin’s primary storage facility for irrigation water.11 Water released
from the lake ºows either into the A-Canal to irrigate farms or down
the Link River to the lower Klamath River.12 The lower Klamath River
is where coho salmon return from the Paciªc during the late autumn
and winter to spawn.13 Though previously the coho and other salmon
spawned all the way into the upper basin, today they can go no farther
than Iron Gate Dam.14
Reclamation, therefore, must balance three primary variables
regarding water allocation: the amount released through the A-Canal
to irrigators, the amount released to coho habitat in the lower
Klamath River, and the amount retained in Upper Klamath Lake
where the suckers live. In years of drought, Reclamation simply is un-
able to meet all these demands.15
B. Endangered Species
For the better part of a century, Reclamation water ºowed virtu-
ally uninterrupted to agricultural lands.16 The federal courts became
heavily involved with water allocation in the Klamath Basin only upon
                                                                                                                     
10 Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Final Biological Assessment:
The Effects of Proposed Actions Related to Klamath Project Operation (April 1,
2002–March 31, 2012) on Federally-Listed Threatened and Endangered Species 21
(Feb. 25, 2002), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/docs/Final_Biological_Assessment_02-25-
02.pdf.
11 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 35.
12 Kenneth A. Rykbost & Rodney Todd, An Overview of the Klamath Reclamation Project
and Related Upper Klamath Basin Hydrology, in OSU Report, supra note 6, at 45, 50–51.
13 Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 10, at 19.
14 See Guillermo Giannico & Christopher Heider, Coho Salmon and Water Management in
the Klamath Basin, in OSU Report, supra note 6, at 119, 120. The National Research Coun-
cil’s Final Report, see discussion infra Part III.E, calls for the “serious” consideration of re-
moving Iron Gate Dam to reestablish access to the upper basin for the coho. Comm. on
Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin, Nat’l Research
Council, Endangered and Threatened Fishes in the Klamath River Basin: Causes
of Decline and Strategies for Recovery 13 (2004) [hereinafter NRC Final Report],
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10838.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). PaciªCorp, which
operates Link River Dam, already has proposed closing some of the less-proªtable up-
stream hydroelectric facilities that block access to sucker habitat. Natalie M. Henry, Tribes,
Enviros Push for Fish Passage, Dam Removal in Relicensing, Land Letter, Mar. 4, 2004.
15 Susan Burke, The Effects of Water Allocation Decisions on Crop Revenue in the Klamath Rec-
lamation Project, in OSU Report, supra note 6, at 231, 240 ªg.3.
16 George Woodward & Jeff Romm, A Policy Assessment of the 2001 Klamath Reclamation
Project Water Allocation Decisions, in OSU Report, supra note 6, at 337, 337.
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the listing of endangered and threatened species.17 Bald eagles, listed
as threatened in 1967;18 Lost River and shortnose suckers, listed as
endangered in 1988; and coho salmon, listed as threatened in 1997,
all inhabit the basin.19 The two species of suckers and the coho are
the three species behind the litigation in the basin.20
1. Lost River and Shortnose Suckers
Historically, the Klamath Tribes depended on c’wam and qapdo,
commonly known as the Lost River and shortnose suckers, for their
livelihood.21 Large populations of these ªsh lived throughout the
lakes and rivers of the Klamath Basin.22 Later, they provided European
settlers with fertilizer and oil, and then supported a popular sports
ªshery.23 By the mid-1980s, however, sucker populations declined
sharply.24 The ªshery closed in 1986,25 and FWS proposed endan-
gered status for both suckers the following year.26
                                                                                                                     
17 See id. at 337–38.
18 Jeff Manning & W. Daniel Edge, Relationships Between Bald Eagle Biology and Federal
Environmental Decisions on the Klamath Reclamation Project, in OSU Report, supra note 6, at
285, 285.
19 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 38–39.
20 Reclamation did have to consult with FWS regarding the bald eagle because of its con-
trol over the allocation of water to the Basin’s National Wildlife Refuges, which support
North America’s largest wintering bald eagle population outside of Alaska. Manning & Edge,
supra note 18, at 286, 297. However, despite FWS’s conclusion that the Klamath Project’s
“impairment and injury of nesting and wintering eagles . . . would be broad,” it determined
that the proposed action jeopardized a population that was “a small proportion of the total
. . . population in the Paciªc Recovery Area”—one of several geographic regions in FWS’s
comprehensive national recovery plan. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
Biological/Conference Opinion Regarding the Effects of Operation of the Bureau
of Reclamation’s Klamath Project on the Endangered Lost River Sucker (Deltistes
Luxatus), Endangered Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes Brevirostris), Threatened
Bald Eagle (Haliaeetus Leucocephalus), and Proposed Critical Habitat for the
Lost River/Shortnose Suckers § III, pt. 1, at 30, 31 (Apr. 2001), http://www.usbr.gov/
mp/kbao/esa/34_ªnal_sucker_bo_4_06_01.pdf. Therefore, while the Project jeopardizes
eagle populations, it does not do so on a large enough scale to require adjustment of its op-
erations. See id. As such, bald eagles have not been the focus of any litigation in the Klamath
Basin.
21 William Kittredge, Balancing Water: Restoring the Klamath Basin 37, 39,
136 (2000).
22 See Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 10, at 21.
23 Douglas F. Markle & Michael S. Cooperman, Relationships Between Lost River and
Shortnose Sucker Biology and Management of Upper Klamath Lake, in OSU Report, supra note 6,
at 93, 98.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Proposal to Determine Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and the Lost
River Sucker, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,145 (proposed Aug. 26, 1987).
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FWS ofªcially listed both sucker species as endangered in 1988,
noting that the Project’s “[d]ams, draining of marshes, diversion of
rivers and dredging of lakes have reduced the range and numbers of
both species by more than 95 percent.”27 Currently, adult suckers only
inhabit Upper Klamath Lake,28 which is the principal water source for
the Project.29
2. Coho Salmon
The Klamath River Basin was once the third-largest salmon-
producing river system on the west coast, generating between 660,000
and 1.1 million spawning adults each year.30 Some estimate the cur-
rent wild adult spawning population to be less than one percent of its
abundance in the mid-twentieth century.31 Numerous factors for the
decline have been cited, including “logging, road building, grazing
and mining activities, urbanization, stream channelization, dams, wet-
land loss, beaver trapping, water withdrawals and unscreened diver-
sions for irrigation.”32
In 1997, NMFS listed the coho as threatened;33 critical habitat was
designated for the coho in 2000.34 NMFS manages the coho because it
is anadromous, meaning it spends part of its life at sea and migrates
up the lower Klamath River—below Iron Gate Dam—to breed.35
B. The Klamath Project
The Klamath Project (Project), authorized in 1905, was one of
the ªrst federal reclamation projects developed through the 1902
                                                                                                                     
27 Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River
Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130, 27,130 ( July 18, 1988).
28 Markle & Cooperman, supra note 23, at 101.
29 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 35.
30 Glen H. Spain, Fisheries Issues for the Paciªc Northwest: The Oceans Begin in the
Watersheds, Presentation for the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy ( June 13–14, 2002),
http://www.pcffa.org/spain_comments.pdf.
31 Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Biological Opinion: On-
going Klamath Project Operations 5 (Apr. 6, 2001), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/
esa/38_cohobo_4_6-01.pdf.
32 Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily
Signiªcant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,592 (May 6, 1997).
33 Threatened Status for the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolution-
arily Signiªcant Unit of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,038 ( June 18, 1997).
34 Designated Critical Habitat: Critical Habitat for 19 Evolutionarily Signiªcant Units
of Salmon and Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and California, 65 Fed. Reg.
7764 (Feb. 16, 2000).
35 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 39.
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Reclamation Act.36 Through the construction of an extensive irriga-
tion system, the Project transformed large areas of marshes and shal-
low lakes in the Klamath Basin into agricultural lands and waterfowl
refuges.37
Under authority of the Act, Reclamation entered into contracts
with various irrigation districts, recovering costs for the Project and
granting the irrigation districts rights to use Project water in perpetu-
ity.38 The irrigation districts then contracted with farmers to deliver
available water at ªxed costs.39
The Reclamation Act also provided that newly reclaimed agricul-
tural land be available for homesteading.40 Many veterans of World
War I and World War II claimed Project lands, available primarily be-
tween 1917 and 1948.41 A signiªcant number of the farmers on the
Project today are descendants of these veterans.42
The Project—currently consisting of seven dams, three
reservoirs, hundreds of miles of canals and laterals, and numerous
drains, pumping plants, and tunnels43—drains approximately 5700
square miles44 to provide water to a population of 4240 people on
1364 farms.45 The Project includes approximately 235,000 acres of
irrigable land, of which about 205,000 acres are irrigated.46
Reclamation operates several of the dams itself; it contracts all
but one of the others to local irrigation districts.47 That dam, the Link
River Dam, is operated by PaciªCorp as part of the Klamath River
Hydroelectric Project.48 It provides electricity to power the Project’s
irrigation pumps at very favorable rates under terms of a ªfty-year
contract with the United States.49 That contract—with rates of $0.003
                                                                                                                     
36 Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 57-1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902); Bureau of Reclama-
tion, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Klamath Project: Historic Operation 5 (Nov.
2000), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/docs/Historic%20Operation.pdf.
37 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 34.
38 Id. at 35.
39 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 61–62. Fees range from twelve to seventy dollars
per acre, and do not depend on how much water (if any) is delivered. Id.
40 Reclamation Act § 3.
41 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 35.
42 Id.
43 Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 36, at iii, 11–22.
44 Id. at 1.
45 Bureau of Reclamation, Klamath Project: Project Data (1992), at http://www.usbr.gov/
dataweb/html/mpklaprjdata.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
46 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 70.
47 Id. at 72.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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to $0.006/kWh, or eighty to ninety percent below current market
rates50—is set to expire in 2006.51
The Project was fully developed by the 1960s and has irrigated
about 210,000 acres of cropland annually.52 Agricultural products
from Project-irrigated land total about $109 million per year, out of
the basin’s total agricultural production of about $239 million.53
C. Water Rights
Like in most western states, the doctrine of prior appropriation
governs water law in Oregon.54 Essentially, that means that older
claims have priority over newer claims.55 Water claims that arise under
the Klamath Project are senior to most other claims because they date
to the Project’s authorization in 1905.56 However, any water claims—
Native American, private, state, and federal—that originate before
these statutes were enacted in 1909 are subject to quantiªcation in an
adjudication proceeding.57 That extensive process, which quantiªes
and certiªes water claims, is still underway.58
Klamath Tribes have hunted, ªshed, and foraged in the Klamath
River Basin for thousands of years.59 They entered into a treaty with
the United States in 1864,60 in which they ceded their aboriginal claim
to twelve million acres in return for a reservation of approximately
800,000 acres in south-central Oregon.61 Article I of the treaty re-
served to the tribes the “exclusive right” to ªsh and gather on the res-
                                                                                                                     
50 William K. Jaeger, What Actually Happened in 2001?: A Comparison of Estimated Impacts
and Reported Outcomes of the Irrigation Curtailment in the Upper Klamath Basin, in OSU Re-
port, supra note 6, at 265, 279.
51 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 72.
52 Harry L. Carlson & Rodney Todd, Effects of the 2001 Water Allocation Decisions on the
Agricultural Landscape and Crop Production in the Klamath Reclamation Project, in OSU Report,
supra note 6, at 163.
53 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 37.
54 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 537.120 (2003).
55 See id.
56 See Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 57.
57 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 539.010(2).
58 Reed Marbut, Legal Aspects of Upper Klamath Basin Water Allocation, in OSU Report,
supra note 6, at 75, 79. The process began in 1975. Id. at 79 n.20.
59 Kittredge, supra note 21, at 37. The Klamath Tribes is a modern association com-
prised of the Klamath, the Modoc, and the Yahooskin. Klamath Tribes, Klamath Tribes
Home, at http://www.klamathtribes.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2004). There currently are 3300
Klamath Tribe members. Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 34.
60 Treaty between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc Tribes
and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707.
61 United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1983) [Adair II].
2005] The “Sound Science” Amendment to the Endangered Species Act 215
ervation, and Article II provided funds to help the Klamath adopt an
agricultural way of life.62 The Klamath Tribes lived on the reservation
in accordance with the treaty’s terms until 1887, when Congress
passed the General Allotment Act.63 That Act authorized the distribu-
tion of communally-held reservation land to individual tribe mem-
bers, some of which then passed to non-Native ownership.64
The United States terminated the Klamath Indian Reservation
and ceased to recognize the Klamath Tribes in 1954.65 The Klamath
Termination Act authorized the government to pay willing tribe
members for their tribal land interests, many of whom sold.66 The
United States also purchased much of the former reservation in 1958
to establish a migratory bird refuge under the jurisdiction of FWS.67
In 1961 and from 1973 to 1975, the United States purchased and
condemned the rest of the former reservation, creating the Winema
National Forest.68 The effect of termination was to leave the United
States with title to approximately seventy percent of the tribal lands.69
It was not until 1986 that the United States repudiated the policy of
termination and renewed its recognition of the Klamath Tribes.70
Though the Klamath Tribes sold much of their land, a series of
cases beginning in 1979 have consistently held that the Klamath Tribes
have a reserved right—dating from time immemorial—to hunt, ªsh,
and gather, as guaranteed by the 1864 treaty.71 This naturally implies a
water claim sufªcient to support habitats for those ªsh and plants.72
Native tribes in the lower Klamath Basin also have claims to basin
water.73 Reservations created in 1855 and 1876 for the Hupa and Yu-
                                                                                                                     
62 Treaty between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc Tribes
and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 708.
63 General Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codiªed in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.).
64 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398. About 25% of the land was passed in this way. Id.
65 Klamath Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 564 (2004). For the Klamath Tribes’ stance
on the policy of termination, see Allen Foreman, Chairman of the Klamath Tribes, Termi-
nation of the Tribes, at http://www.klamathtribes.org/TerminationStatement.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2004).
66 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398; Marbut, supra note 58, at 83.
67 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398.
68 Id.; Marbut, supra note 58, at 83.
69 Adair II, 723 F.2d at 1398; Marbut, supra note 58, at 83.
70 Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 566 (2004).
71 United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979) [Adair I], aff’d as modiªed by
Adair II, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), later proceeding at United States v. Adair, 187 F.
Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Or. 2002) [Adair III].
72 See Adair I, 478 F. Supp. at 345; see also Woodward & Romm, supra note 16, at 343.
73 Id. at 343–44.
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rok Tribes reserved salmon ªshing rights and the water to support it.74
The Karuk also potentially have an unextinguished aboriginal ªshing-
right claim.75
Finally, the federal government has water claims to support the
basin’s National Wildlife Refuges (Refuges).76 The basin is situated at
a “strategic junction” in the routes of the Paciªc Flyway, which annu-
ally hosts the largest concentration of migratory waterfowl on the
continent.77 FWS, therefore, attempts to maintain the Refuges in their
“historic natural state, as wetlands to provide optimal conditions for
wildlife and, in particular, for migratory birds.”78 Congress, however,
established the basin’s Refuges—and their corresponding water
rights—just after it authorized the Klamath Project.79 Water claims for
the Refuges, therefore, are junior to those of most of the agricultural
land within the Project.80
Much of the water that the Refuges receive consists of “return
ºows,” or unused irrigation water.81 Large, marshy wetlands, these ar-
eas serve as natural kidneys that ªlter agricultural nutrients from the
water.82 Though many of the wetlands have been converted to agricul-
tural land, there currently is much discussion of restoring some of this
land in order to improve water quality.83
II. Setting the Stage for the Crisis of 2001
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 played an instrumen-
tal role in the decisions leading up to the water crisis of 2001.84 The
ESA was enacted “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be con-
served.”85 Section 7 of the ESA singles out federal agencies, like Recla-
mation, requiring them to refrain from actions that would “jeopardize”
                                                                                                                     
74 Id. “Hupa refers to the people; Hoopa (a word invented by the federal government)
refers to the reservation.” Id. at 338 n.4.
75 Id. at 344.
76 See Adair I, 478 F. Supp. at 340.
77 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 37.
78 Adair I, 478 F. Supp. at 340.
79 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 57.
80 Id.
81 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 37.
82 See Markle & Cooperman, supra note 23, at 107–08.
83 Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 20, at i.
84 See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1228, 1230–38 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
85 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
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endangered or threatened species, or adversely modify those species’
designated critical habitats.86 Agency determinations of whether an ac-
tion will jeopardize a species must be supported by “the best scientiªc
and commercial data available,” a seemingly innocuous requirement.87
With contentious issues such as water allocation in the Klamath Basin,
however, parties agree only that the best available science should apply;
they rarely agree upon what constitutes the best science or what conclu-
sions should be drawn from it.88
A. Application of the Endangered Species Act
The ESA ªrst requires Reclamation to “conduct a biological as-
sessment for the purpose of identifying any endangered species or
threatened species which is likely to be affected by [the proposed]
action.”89 Reclamation then submits its biological assessment to FWS
and NMFS,90 which determine whether the proposed action is likely
to affect the species.91 If so, formal consultation is required, meaning
that FWS or NMFS must issue a biological opinion (BiOp) setting
forth “a summary of . . . how the agency action affects the species or
its critical habitat.”92 If the agency concludes that “jeopardy” to the
species or “adverse modiªcation” to the species’ habitat is likely, it
should set forth “reasonable and prudent alternatives” (RPAs).93
Reclamation consults with FWS regarding its operation of the
Link River Dam, which directly controls the level of Upper Klamath
Lake, the suckers’ primary habitat.94 Water is released from the lake
through the A-Canal to agricultural land, or through Link River to-
ward the Iron Gate Dam and the lower Klamath River, where the coho
                                                                                                                     
86 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
87 Id. § 1536(a)(2).
88 See generally Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 1, at 340–41 (discussing the inability of
“science” to solve such debates objectively, and noting that “[t]he ESA tries to ªnesse the
culture clash and hide some of the uncertainties by framing the conºict as one of scientiªc
facts rather than of values”).
89 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). See generally Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 138 F.
Supp. 2d at 1240–42 (setting forth the applicable regulatory requirements under the
ESA).
90 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
91 Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Markle & Cooperman, supra note 23, at 93; Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 69.
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salmon spawn.95 Reclamation consults with NMFS to determine the
ºows released to the lower Klamath River.96
1. Lost River and Shortnose Suckers
Reclamation’s obligation to consult with FWS regarding the Proj-
ect’s effects on suckers began in 1989, after the suckers were listed as
endangered.97 Upper Klamath Lake is very shallow: its surface area
varies between 60,000 and 90,000 acres—historically 105,000 acres—
depending on its level.98 Before irrigation, that level varied between
4,139.9 and 4,143.0 feet above sea level, with a mean annual variation
of about two feet.99 After the construction of the Link River Dam in
1921, water levels have varied between 4,136.8 and 4,143.3 feet above
sea level, a range of about 6.5 feet.100 The lake is at “dead storage,” or
the bottom of the dam, at 4,136.0 feet above sea level.101
FWS’s ªrst BiOp, in 1992, set the minimum lake elevation at 4139
feet above sea level.102 The summer elevation was authorized to drop
to 4137 feet in critically dry years, but no more than four years in ten,
or for more than two consecutive years.103 Successive BiOps for annual
Project operations plans through the 1990s retained these two major
components, in addition to other measures designed to improve wa-
ter quality and sucker habitat.104
Reclamation largely complied with these BiOps, though it failed
to implement a few of FWS’s requirements.105 For example, Reclama-
tion failed to install screens at the A-Canal to prevent suckers from
becoming entrained.106 A report released by PaciªCorp in 2002 found
that 109,000 suckers became stuck in the diversions between March
1997 and October 1999 alone.107 Reclamation also failed to submit a
                                                                                                                     
95 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 50–51.
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98 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 47.
99 Id. at 47–48.
100 Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 20, § III, pt. 2, at 38.
101 Rykbost & Todd, supra note 12, at 48.
102 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 39.
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105 Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 20, § I, at 4.
106 Id. § I, at 4–5. The screens were ªnally completed in 2003. Kehn Gibson, On Time,
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2003, at 1.
107 Dylan Darling, PaciªCorp to Close Plants on Link River, Herald & News (Klamath
Falls, Or.), Jan. 18, 2004, at A1.
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report on a potential ªsh ladder for the Link River Dam, and to de-
velop and implement a long-term plan that would avoid and minimize
incidental take108 associated with the Project.109 While stating that it
was working on its long-term plan, Reclamation continued to submit
and operate under annual Project operations plans.110
2. Coho Salmon
Reclamation’s ªrst consultation with NMFS regarding the threat-
ened coho salmon took place in 1999.111 Prior to the coho’s listing in
1997, the stream ºows released at Iron Gate Dam into the lower
Klamath River were determined by PaciªCorp’s hydroelectric dam
project license, issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC).112 FERC ºow recommendations, however, were subject to
senior rights and water availability, so they were not always met.113
Since 1999 was a comparatively wet year, Reclamation proposed to
operate the Project that year at higher ºows than those set out by
FERC.114 In response, NMFS issued its 1999 BiOp stating that Project
operations were unlikely to jeopardize the coho.115
In August 1999, Dr. Thomas B. Hardy of Utah State University re-
leased a preliminary report—the Hardy Phase I Report—commissioned
by the Department of the Interior the year before.116 The report’s pur-
pose was to study “the historical and existing status of the anadromous
ªsh [including coho salmon] within the lower Klamath River” as well as
to “make[] interim minimum monthly ºow recommendations for the
main stem Klamath River below Iron Gate Dam.”117 The Hardy Phase I
Report recommended ºows much higher than those in the FERC li-
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cense.118 The Department of the Interior also commissioned Hardy to
produce a Phase II Report, including site-speciªc ªeld studies and state-
of-the-art instream ºow modeling.119 That report has been released only
in draft form, in November 2001, but many still regard it as the best sci-
entiªc data available.120
B. The 2000 and 2001 Project Operations Plans
The Project operations plan went through several iterations in
2000 before the ªnal version was completed.121 Reclamation’s ªrst bio-
logical assessment (BA), submitted to NMFS on April 4, 2000, proposed
ºow recommendations from the Iron Gate Dam that were substantially
below other recommendations.122 Speciªcally, it provided sixty-two per-
cent of a previously rejected proposal, and in some months even fell
below the original FERC ºows.123 Signiªcantly, the ºows also met only
forty-two percent of the Hardy Phase I recommendations.124
Though given only one day to respond, a technical review team—
consisting of members of FWS; Reclamation; the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs; the U.S. Geological Survey; NMFS; the Yurok, Hoopa, and Karuk
Tribes; and California’s Department of Fish and Game—”objected
strenuously” to the proposed ºow levels.125 Dr. Hardy responded on
April 12 by releasing preliminary draft recommendations.126 Two days
                                                                                                                     
118 Id. at 44 tbl.15.
119 Dr. Thomas B. Hardy & R. Craig Addley, Utah State Univ., Evaluation of In-
terim Instream Flow Needs in the Klamath River: Phase II Final Report 44 (draft, Nov.
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grams/klamath/coallfactsheet2.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004); Press Release, Paciªc Coast
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Withdrawals and Low Flows Were Primary Cause of Klamath Salmon Kill ( Jan. 3, 2003),
http://www.pcffa.org/CDFGKillRept-PR1.pdf.
121 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1235–36.
122 Id. at 1235.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1232, 1235.
126 Id. at 1235.
2005] The “Sound Science” Amendment to the Endangered Species Act 221
later, the technical team, including Hardy, unanimously considered
those recommendations too low; Hardy then presented a revised ver-
sion of the preliminary draft recommendations.127 He stressed that his
recommendations were still subject to revision as he continued to
reªne his analysis.128
Reclamation’s ªnal 2000 Project operations plan called for in-
stream ºows generally closest to those in Hardy’s ªrst response, which
he and the entire technical review team subsequently had concluded
were too low.129 After all the drafts of the 2000 Project operations plan
were completed, Reclamation failed to initiate formal consultation
with NMFS.130 It also failed to complete a ªnal BA for 2000, allegedly
waiting for the Hardy Phase II Report to be completed.131 Thus, the
Project operated in 2000 without approval by NMFS, in clear violation
of the ESA.132
Reclamation did initiate formal consultations in early 2001.133 In
January, Reclamation submitted its BA to NMFS, proposing in-stream
ºows that dropped very low—to 398 cubic feet per second (cfs)—in
critically dry years.134 Reclamation also submitted its BA to FWS in
February, proposing levels for Upper Klamath Lake as low as 4,136.8
feet above sea level in critically dry years.135 In mid-March, Reclama-
tion received draft BiOps from both agencies concluding that the
proposed actions would indeed jeopardize the endangered and
threatened species.136
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ion: Ongoing Klamath Project Operations 29 (draft, 2001), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/
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Table 2: Iron Gate Dam Water Flows (cfs)
Apr. May June July Aug. Sept.
1905–1912 Mean (Pre-Project)141 3857 3627 2930 2147 1503 1370
1961–1996 Mean142 2970 2046 1050 758 970 1303
FERC Permit Minimum143 1300 1000 710 710 1000 1300
Hardy Phase I Interim Recommendation144 3307 3056 2249 1714 1346 1395
2001 Reclamation BA145 572 513 506 428 398 538
2001 NMFS Final BiOp146 1700 1700 1900 1000 1000 1000
2001 Actual Flows147 1598 1727 1897 1012 1026 1025
Hardy Phase II Recommendation
(critically dry year)148 1600 1600 1350 1000 1000 1000
Hardy Phase II Recommendation
(average year)149 3300 3100 2300 1530 1250 1350
C. The 2001 Order
On April 3, 2001, the District Court for the Northern District of
California announced its decision in Paciªc Coast Federation of Fisher-
men’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.150 After Reclamation failed to
                                                                                                                     
conservative in 2001, see Markle & Cooperman, supra note 23, at 113 (discussing decision-
making in the face of uncertainty).
137 Michael S. Cooperman & Douglas F. Markle, The Endangered Species Act and the Na-
tional Research Council’s Interim Judgment in Klamath Basin, Fisheries, Mar. 2003, at 10, 17
tbl.1.
138 See Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 135, at 3 tbl.1.
139 See Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 136, § 3, pt. 2, at 157.
140 See Cooperman & Markle, supra note 137, at 17 tbl.1.
141 See Hardy & Addley, supra note 119, at 38 tbl.5.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Inst. for Natural Sys. Eng’g, supra note 116, at 44 tbl.15.
145 See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Biological Assess-
ment of the Klamath Project’s Continuing Operations on Southern Oregon/
Northern California ESU Coho Salmon and Critical Habitat for Southern Ore-
gon/Northern California ESU Coho Salmon 11 tbl.2 (draft, Nov. 21, 2000), http://
www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/esa/36_DraftcohoBA_4_6_01.pdf.
146 See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., supra note 31, at 31–32.
147 See Giannico & Heider, supra note 14, at 139 tbl.2.
148 See Hardy & Addley, supra note 119, at 244 ªg.154.
149 See id.
150 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Table 1: 2001 Upper Klamath Lake Levels Compared to 1990–2000 Mean Level 137 (feet)
June July Aug. Sept. Oct.
Reclamation BA Proposed Levels138 -3.20 -2.63 -2.54 -2.32 -2.02
FWS BiOp Recommended Levels139 -0.15 0.10 0.94 1.34 1.05
Actual Levels140 -0.07 0.03 0.15 0.41 0.62
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consult NMFS for its 2000 Project operations plan, ªshermen and en-
vironmental groups ªled suit. Plaintiffs sought both a declaration that
Reclamation was in violation of the ESA and an injunction preventing
Reclamation from providing water deliveries to irrigators unless water
ºows met those recommended in the Hardy Phase I Report.151
First, the court held that Reclamation had violated the ESA by
failing to pursue formal consultation with NMFS.152 Next, the court
granted plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, citing the strong lan-
guage of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill and its progeny153 and Recla-
mation’s “substantial procedural violation of the [ESA] in operating
[the Project] for an entire year . . . without . . . engaging in consulta-
tion as the Act and the regulations speciªcally required it to do.”154
The court also sharply rebuked Reclamation for its failure to com-
plete a long-term Project operations plan, an action that NMFS had
found to be “very important.”155 Thus, the court granted plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment, and enjoined Reclamation
from sending irrigation deliveries from Klamath Project
whenever Klamath River ºows at Iron Gate Dam drop below
the minimum ºows recommended in the Hardy Phase I re-
port, until such time as [Reclamation] completes a concrete
plan to guide operations during the new water year, and
consultation concerning that plan is completed.156
FWS completed its ªnal BiOp for the suckers on April 5, 2001,
immediately following the court’s decision.157 Its RPAs included a
minimum level for Upper Klamath Lake at 4140 feet above sea
level.158 It also discarded the rule allowing low lake levels in four non-
consecutive years out of ten.159 NMFS released its ªnal BiOp the fol-
lowing day.160 Its RPAs involved Iron Gate Dam discharges ranging
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from 1000 to 2100 cfs.161 These amounts were greater than the FERC
permit requirements—prior to the ESA entering the picture—but in a
critically dry year they would prove to be less than the ºows in 1999.162
Reclamation adopted these RPAs and mailed a notice to Project
water users below Upper Klamath Lake, warning them that “severe
water shortages are likely during the upcoming 2001 irrigation sea-
son.”163 In response, various irrigation districts and water users’ asso-
ciations ªled suit in the District Court for the District of Oregon, ar-
guing that Reclamation’s 2001 Project operations plan breached their
contractual rights to use water from Reclamation’s Project.164 The
court rejected their challenge, holding that “plaintiffs cannot assert
breach of contract based on Reclamation’s allocation of water to pro-
tect the suckers and salmon” when their “contract rights to irrigation
water are subservient to ESA and tribal trust requirements.”165 With
that decision, the court terminated the irrigators’ chance for normal
water deliveries in 2001.166
III. The Crisis of 2001 and the Ensuing Problems of 2002
A. The Crisis
Snowpack during the winter of 2001—which, upon melting, sup-
plies the Klamath Basin with water during the summer—indicated the
lowest expected inºow on record to Upper Klamath Lake.167 In fact,
the city of Klamath Falls received just three inches of rain between Oc-
tober 2000 and April 2001, about one-third of the normal level.168 Nev-
ertheless, the total water available in Upper Klamath Lake in 2001 was
more than that in 1992 or 1994, and similar to that in 1991.169 Thus,
the level of drought was not unprecedented.170 For nearly a century,
Project farmers had relied on Reclamation for irrigation water regard-
less of weather; unlike other farmers, they enjoyed a very dependable
                                                                                                                     
161 Id. at 31–32.
162 Hathaway & Welch, supra note 6, at 40–41.
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supply.171 In 2001, however, agriculture received 22% of the average
diversion for the previous decade, while the Refuges received 71%
and the lower Klamath River coho habitat received 68%.172
While water was held at Upper Klamath Lake, regular deliveries
were made in the Lost River portion of the Project above Harpold
Dam.173 Also, many farmers utilized supplemental irrigation water
from wells, exchanges, and purchased sources.174 Additionally, there
was a small release in late July and August—40,000 acre-feet—provid
ing signiªcant relief to pastures and hay crops.175 Nevertheless, appli-
cation of the ESA resulted in 344,000 acre-feet of water being diverted
from irrigation purposes.176 Thus, while the water available was similar
to that in other recent dry years, irrigation for agriculture received a
much smaller portion than it ever had before.177
What is most striking about the crisis is the considerable coverage
it received from the national media. The Project, which provides wa-
ter to a mere 4240 people on 1364 farms,178 suddenly was the focus of
national attention, in an epic battle of “farmer against ªsh.”179 The
Wilderness Society named the Klamath Basin one of the nation’s
“most endangered wildlands”;180 American Rivers later assigned the
Klamath River similar status.181 Wall Street Journal editorials railed envi-
ronmentalists’ hidden agenda as “rural cleansing” and “expung[ing]
humans from the countryside,”182 while denouncing the sucker as a
“bottom-feeding scavenger.”183
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In several symbolic efforts near the Fourth of July, farmers gath-
ered at the head gates and forced open irrigation canals.184 Adding to
the drama, local sheriffs refused to intervene, and the district attorney
refused to ªle charges.185 The U.S. Senate narrowly defeated a meas-
ure by Gordon Smith, a Republican from Oregon, that would have
sidestepped ESA requirements and authorized a lower level for Upper
Klamath Lake.186 Triggering references to snail darters and spotted
owls, the Paciªc Legal Foundation ªled a petition to have Secretary of
the Interior Gale Norton convene the Endangered Species Commit-
tee, also known as the “God Squad,” to review the decision to deny the
farmers irrigation water.187 She dismissed the petition on standing
grounds, as the Bush Administration initially stayed out of the dis-
pute.188 Frustrated farmers ªled suit against the United States seeking
one billion dollars under a takings theory.189
Initial estimates varied widely, but many postulated $250 million in
lost agriculture revenues in 2001.190 However, net crop revenue on the
Project was actually reduced by only $27 million to $46 million; emer-
gency payments further offset this amount by $35 million to $37 mil-
lion.191 The outcome was that net farming in 2001 was somewhere be-
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tors’ contracts, unlike those of the Tulare plaintiffs, speciªcally limit the government’s
liability in case of drought. Klamath Water Users Ass’n v. Patterson, 15 F. Supp. 2d 990, 992
(D. Or. 1998).
190 See Douglas Jehl, Cries of “Save the Suckerªsh” Rile Farmers’ Political Allies, N.Y. Times,
June 20, 2001, at A1.
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tween an $11 million loss and a $10 million gain.192 Interestingly, by
contributing emergency payments to the basin, the local and federal
governments effectively spread the cost of the drought across a wider
population so that no one group—or the environment—shouldered
the cost alone.193
B. The NRC Interim Report
National attention abruptly turned away from the Klamath Basin’s
water crisis following September 11, 2001. Irrigation protestors with-
drew from the head gates of the Project, calling a temporary “truce”
with the federal government in light of the national emergency.194
November saw the release of a draft of the long-awaited Hardy
Phase II Report, calling for increased ºows into the lower Klamath
River.195 The next month, the Interior and Commerce Departments
sought review of the 2001 NMFS and FWS BiOps by the National Re-
search Council (NRC), a branch of the National Academy of Sci-
ences.196 The NRC created the Committee on Endangered and Threat-
ened Fishes in the Klamath Basin, comprised of twelve independent
scientists and scholars, to review evidence and to prepare a report that
then was circulated to independent reviewers.197 The NRC did not con-
                                                                                                                     
192 Id.
193 See Bruce Weber et al., Impact of the 2001 Klamath Reclamation Project Operations Plan
on the Economy of the Upper Klamath Basin, in OSU Report, supra note 6, at 251 (discussing
the disparate impact of the crisis across the Basin’s residents, even among irrigators). Co-
operman and Markle argue that:
A workable solution to the “Klamath Crisis” should be fair, requiring all water
users to participate in an equitable distribution of limited water and society at
large to shoulder responsibilities and share costs. Perhaps unknown to many,
the latter is exactly what happened in Klamath Basin in 2001, with the larger
public mitigating the cost of ESA protection through state and federal assis-
tance.
Cooperman & Markle, supra note 137, at 18.
194 Group Suspends Protest in Oregon, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2001, at A19.
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sider the Hardy Phase II Report because it existed only in draft form.198
The NRC released an interim report in February 2002.199
The NRC Interim Report concluded that there was “no substan-
tial scientiªc foundation” to support the reduction in irrigation water
in the 2001 NMFS BiOp.200 It also found that Reclamation’s 2001 BA
proposals could not be justiªed scientiªcally.201 Essentially, the NRC
concluded that there were not enough data available to prove the ne-
cessity of making any changes to the water ºows from the previous ten
years at Iron Gate Dam.202 Nevertheless, the NRC ªnding of “no sub-
stantial scientiªc foundation” underlying the decision to halt irriga-
tion water deliveries galvanized irrigators, who insisted that those re-
ductions were entirely unnecessary.203
C. To the Opposite Extreme in 2002
Three weeks after the release of the NRC Interim Report, Recla-
mation released a BA to be submitted to both FWS and NMFS cover-
ing April 2002 to March 2012 (2002–12 BA).204 The 2002–12 BA
largely was consistent with the NRC Interim Report, returning ºows
to their average levels from the previous decade.205 NMFS responded
to the 2002–12 BA by releasing consecutive drafts of its BiOp, recom-
mending increased ºows below Iron Gate Dam to sustain coho habi-
tat, which Reclamation rejected.206 NMFS then released a ªnal BiOp
on May 31, 2002, with recommended stream ºows that reºected the
stream ºows in Reclamation’s BA.207 Notably, the BiOp validated Rec-
lamation’s contention that since the Project encompasses ªfty-seven
percent of the basin’s irrigable land, Reclamation should be responsi-
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ble only for ªfty-seven percent of the remedy.208 It proposed an inter-
governmental task force to provide for the additional water.209 In par-
ticular, NMFS “anticipates that the States of California and Oregon
will participate in the process [and] step up enforcement of existing
water rights or water rights laws,” effectively instructing the state gov-
ernments to restrain junior water users outside Project lands from ir-
rigating their own land.210
Reclamation accepted this BiOp as its 2002 Project operations
plan, and scheduled full irrigation deliveries.211 The reopening of the
irrigation head gates in March 2002 was accompanied by a high-
proªle ceremony attended by Oregon Senator Gordon Smith and two
Cabinet-level ofªcials.212
As if on cue, one of the largest ªsh kills in United States history
took place in the lower Klamath River in late September 2002.213 At
least 34,000 salmon—likely an underestimate, though most were un-
listed Chinook salmon214—returning up the Klamath River to spawn,
died in warm, shallow, disease-ridden water.215 Less than a month
later, NMFS ªsheries biologist Michael Kelly ªled for whistleblower
protection with the U.S. Ofªce of Special Counsel, alleging that the
successive drafts of the 2002 NMFS BiOp were the result of increased
pressure from the Bush Administration to ªnd a result consistent with
irrigation interests.216 John Kerry, Democratic Senator from Massa-
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chusetts and chair of the Oceans and Fisheries Subcommittee, called
for a formal investigation.217 The Ofªce of Special Counsel eventually
declined to prosecute, claiming that it could not substitute its judg-
ment for that of NMFS.218
Numerous factors were blamed for the ªsh kill, including water
temperature, quantity, and quality, an unusually large and early
salmon run, and weather,219 but low ºows due to irrigation diversions
initially were blamed most fervently by environmentalists.220 The ªrst
ofªcial scientiªc analysis took approximately three months to com-
plete.221 That report, released by the California Department of Fish
and Game (CDFG) in January 2003, criticized the low water ºows,
concluding that while multiple factors may have been at play, “ºow is
the only factor that can be controlled to any degree.”222 In a report
that was not released until November 2003—a full ten months after
the CDFG report—the federal FWS came to essentially the same con-
clusion: low ºows were a causative factor in the ªsh kill, though it em-
phasized that other factors also were at play.223
Just after the ªsh kill, a U.S. Geological Survey report was leaked
to the press that concluded there were far more economic beneªts to
be had in the basin by restoring water for ªsh habitat and recreation
rather than continuing to use it to irrigate farms.224 Speciªcally, the
report urged that $5 billion in restoration costs easily would be offset
by $36 billion in beneªts from recreational activities.225 This is com-
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pared with $239 million at most in total agricultural production in the
basin.226
The winter in late 2002 and early 2003 was markedly dry, and
fears rose that the basin was in for another drought year.227 Fortu-
nately, a series of spring storms rendered the potential crisis moot by
replenishing the basin’s water table and supplying sufªcient water for
the irrigation season.228
D. The 2003 Order
In July 2003, the District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia issued an order invalidating Reclamation’s 2002–2012 Project
operations plan.229 Paciªc Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associa-
tions (PCFFA), numerous environmental groups, tribes, and Repre-
sentative Mike Thompson of California had challenged the plan as
insufªcient to protect the coho salmon.230 Plaintiffs argued that the
Hardy Phase II Report, though in draft form, represented the “best
scientiªc data available,” and that Reclamation must release ºows
consistent with its requirements in order to avoid jeopardizing the
coho.231 Plaintiffs’ case was strong politically given the enormity of the
ªsh kill.232 The court reviewed Reclamation’s plans under the defer-
ential “arbitrary” or “capricious” standard laid out in the Administra-
tive Procedures Act (APA).233
First, the court evaluated the target long-term and short-term ºow
rates speciªed in the 2002 NMFS BiOp and adopted by Reclamation for
its 2002 Project operation plan.234 The ºow rates were established by
taking the ºow rates speciªed in the NRC Interim Report—which were
held by NMFS to be insufªcient in its ªrst draft BiOp—and adding cer-
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tain measures to increase ºow, including the creation of a water bank.235
The water bank, a sort of short-term subsidy, establishes a mechanism
whereby the government pays irrigators who willingly relinquish their
water claims or use alternative sources of water.236 In any case, because
the ºow rates were somewhat of a compromise between the conºicting
studies by the NRC and Hardy, the court concluded that the NMFS ºow
rates themselves could not be found arbitrary or capricious.237
Next, however, the court examined NMFS’s proposed intergov-
ernmental committee, which was to “step up” enforcement of senior
water rights.238 ESA regulations direct NMFS to consider the effects of
state and private activities that “are reasonably certain to occur” when
evaluating a proposed action.239 The court concluded: “There is noth-
ing to suggest that it is ‘reasonably certain’ that the States and the
Tribes will participate in the Conservation Implementation Commit-
tee. Furthermore, even with their participation, it is not ‘reasonably
certain’ that the Conservation Committee will achieve the target ºow
rates.”240 The court quoted a letter from the CDFG noting its “little
conªdence” that the Committee’s complicated task could be com-
pleted.241 The court held that NMFS’s reliance on uncertain state and
private actions was indeed arbitrary and capricious under the APA.242
The court also rejected NMFS’s incidental take statement
(ITS).243 An ITS is a trigger that compels the acting agency—Reclama-
tion in this case—to initiate further consultation with the listing
agency—here NMFS—when an unacceptable level of incidental tak-
ing of the species occurs.244 The ITS in NMFS’s ªnal BiOp stated that
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NMFS expects some level of incidental take to occur due to
implementation of some of the actions outlined in the rea-
sonable and prudent alternative. However, the best scientiªc
and commercial data available are not sufªcient to enable
NMFS to estimate a speciªc amount of incidental take of
Klamath River coho salmon.245
The court found that NMFS’s ITS was devoid of any concrete
threshold that would indicate to Reclamation that further consulta-
tion was necessary.246 Since such a standard failed to limit the Project’s
incidental take of coho salmon, the court held that it was arbitrary
and capricious under the APA.247 After identifying these deªciencies,
the court remanded the 2002 NMFS BiOp to the agency for amend-
ing.248 While plaintiffs were successful in that respect, the court re-
fused to nullify the BiOp for the 2002 irrigation year.249 Rather, it con-
cluded that the deªciencies were not associated with the immediate
phase of the plan, which therefore could remain in place until NMFS
completed its revisions.250 Both sides claimed victory.251
E. The NRC Final Report
In October 2003, the NRC released its ªnal report.252 While the
NRC Interim Report focused on the 2001 BiOps, the task of the NRC
Final Report was signiªcantly broader: to “thoroughly address the sci-
entiªc aspects related to the continued survival of coho salmon and
shortnose and Lost River suckers in the Klamath River Basin.”253 The
NRC reiterated its conclusion that the 2001 decisions to halt irrigation
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deliveries were not grounded in sound science.254 The NRC, however,
also defended FWS and NMFS against charges that they used “junk sci-
ence,” insisting that professional judgment must play a role.255
The NRC Final Report posited several recommendations for re-
solving the basin’s conºicts.256 First, it criticized FWS and NMFS for
not focusing on any water users but Reclamation.257 Its ªrst recom-
mendation was that NMFS and FWS should “inventory all governmen-
tal, tribal, and private actions that are causing unauthorized take of
endangered suckers and threatened coho salmon in the Klamath Ba-
sin and seek either to authorize this take with appropriate mitigative
measures or to eliminate it.”258 It also offered a number of recom-
mendations for research and monitoring in the basin.259
The NRC also proposed recovery actions that were justiªed based
on its current scientiªc knowledge.260 For the suckers, the NRC rec-
ommended: the removal of Chiloquin Dam in order to expand
spawning habitat; facilitation of passage at blockages and dams;
screening of water intakes at Link River Dam; modiªcation of screen-
ing and intake procedures at the A-Canal; and other measures to pro-
tect and expand habitat.261 For the coho, the NRC recommended:
reestablishment of cool summer ºows in Klamath tributaries; provi-
sion for passage at all small dams; measures to protect coho habitat
from other land uses such as livestock and agriculture; and “serious
evaluation . . . of the beneªts to coho salmon from elimination of
Dwinnell Dam and Iron Gate Dam.”262 The NRC estimated that its
recommendations would cost $25 million to $35 million, excluding
major projects such as dam removal.263
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F. Fodder for ESA Amendment Proponents
Like with the NRC Interim Report, many irrigators, politicians,
and media groups latched on to a few particular sentences of the NRC
Final Report to argue that the 2001 delivery curtailments were fool-
hardy and unsupported by science.264 Without examining the com-
plexity of the issues, the role of professional judgment, and the lack of
available data, many saw the reports as plain and unmistakable proof
that irrigators’ claims had been correct all along.265 Some even found
the reports to be proof of agency capriciousness in insisting that more
water was needed for the suckers and coho.266 As such, both NRC re-
ports fueled the debate surrounding the role of science in Klamath
Basin decisionmaking.267
Indeed, science and the conclusions to be drawn from it are at
the very heart of the controversy in the Klamath Basin. Behind all of
the scientiªc reports and analyses relevant to the basin—including the
Hardy reports, NRC reports, Reclamation BAs, and FWS and NMFS
BiOps, among others—are different sets of data, assumptions, levels
of risk-aversion, areas of expertise, amounts of experience, and value
judgments.268 It is no surprise that the controversy over scientiªc con-
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clusions and methodology in the Klamath Basin has reignited debate
over the ESA itself.269
Ever since the question was framed as a one-dimensional struggle
between jobs and animals, critics of the ESA have disparaged it as a
federal roadblock that puts too high a price on preserving species that
serve no useful purpose to humans.270 They point to the fact that al-
though hundreds of species have been listed, only a handful have re-
covered.271 Proponents see it as one of the few environmental statutes
with any teeth, providing a vehicle for forcing agencies and citizens to
consider the ramiªcations of their decisions on the environment.272
Passionately lauded and fervently derided, consensus exists only in the
notion that the ESA has become a potent weapon in preventing actions
that contribute to the decline of endangered and threatened species.273
Overwhelmingly passed by Congress,274 the ESA has been the
subject of numerous reform efforts since its inception in 1973.275 The
2001 crisis in the Klamath Basin and the NRC reports directly led to
the most recent proposal to amend the ESA the Sound Science for
Endangered Species Act Planning Act (Sound Science Act).276 Con-
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gressman Greg Walden and Senator Gordon Smith, Republicans from
Oregon, have introduced identical versions of the Sound Science Act
in the House and Senate.277 The Act’s self-stated purpose is to “give
greater weight to scientiªc or commercial data that is empirical or has
been ªeld-tested or peer-reviewed.”278 Its sponsors seek to avoid crises
like that in the Klamath Basin in 2001 by standardizing the science
used in ESA decisionmaking.279
IV. The Sound Science Act and Its Implications
for the Klamath Basin
The Sound Science Act has three principal sections: section 2:
“Sound Science”; section 3: “Peer Review”; and section 4: “Improved
Recovery Planning.”280 Section 2 requires that FWS and NMFS utilize
peer-reviewed science and ªeld data, particularly when making ªnal
decisions regarding endangered or threatened species.281 However,
that requirement is somewhat redundant and serves only to create
confusion regarding the deªnition of science.282 Section 3 would es-
sentially require that all major species-related decisions be evaluated
by independent reviewers before they become ªnal.283 Departures
from the reviewers’ recommendations would have to be explained by
FWS or NMFS.284 This obligation overlooks the role of professional
judgment in the face of uncertainty and the inherent ambiguity in any
scientiªc determination.285 Its primary effect, therefore, would be to
delay, hinder, or thwart agency decisionmaking.286 Finally, section 4 of
the Sound Science Act would open the science in the decisionmaking
process to challenges from some, but not all, interested parties.287 The
result would be substantial inºuence for irrigators, but dismissal for
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Klamath Tribes—who hold superior treaty-based water rights—and
downstream ªshermen.288
Taken as a whole, the likely effects of the Sound Science Act in
the Klamath Basin are protracted agency decisionmaking, increased
inºuence for irrigators but not for other interested parties, more sub-
stantial impediments to ªnalizing agency decisions, and more oppor-
tunity for litigation. Indeed, the heightened barriers for ESA deter-
minations effectively constitute a signiªcant step away from the heart
of the ESA: the Precautionary Principle.289 Finally, the Sound Science
Act will serve to validate parties’ all-or-nothing approaches, at the ex-
pense of cooperation and real solutions.290 As such, it likely will be-
come a tool for individual interests rather than an instrument for a
basin-wide resolution.
A. “Sound Science”
First, section 2 would require FWS and NMFS to “give greater
weight to scientiªc or commercial data that is empirical or has been
ªeld-tested or peer-reviewed.”291 This requirement is redundant, con-
sidering that those agencies have had joint policies in place since
1994 ensuring that ESA decisions rely on the best scientiªc informa-
tion available292 and incorporating the solicitation of independent
peer review of listing proposals and recovery plans.293
The Sound Science Act also would impose a “ªeld data” require-
ment for the listing of any species as threatened or endangered.294 List-
ing determinations would have to be “supported by data obtained by
observation of the species in the ªeld.”295 Already listed, the coho and
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suckers would face no new challenge by this requirement.296 Recent
efforts to list the green sturgeon and other species, however, would be
burdened by the ªeld data requirement.297 The provision also seems to
eliminate a signiªcant tool available to scientists—population model-
ing—which projects current data into the future.
This provision could be burdensome in general, given that can-
didate species are rare, almost by deªnition: “there may be little or no
information on many of the species facing extinction, and insufªcient
personnel or funds available to conduct studies.”298 Given the cost of
scientiªc studies, particularly ªeld studies, far fewer species may end
up being listed.299
The ªeld data requirement also includes a directive that FWS and
NMFS accept ªeld data collected and submitted by affected landown-
ers.300 Landowner-submitted ªeld data, however, might not always be
the best available science; other types of science or ªeld data from
other sources certainly could be the soundest science in many cases.301
Moreover, requiring the agencies to accept landowner data would give
substantial inºuence to those landowners, while providing no such
inºuence to other interested parties.302
Section 2 would also require the agencies to “promulgate regula-
tions that establish criteria that must be met for scientiªc and com-
mercial data to be used” in listing protected species.303 Again, FWS
and NMFS already have a joint policy in place that establishes criteria,
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procedures, and guidance for determining the “best scientiªc and
commercial data available” under the ESA.304 This requirement of the
Sound Science Act therefore fails to add much substance to the ESA’s
current application.305
However, by adding its own principles to the deªnition of the
best science, the Sound Science Act potentially confuses the very
deªnition it seeks to elucidate.306 Ostensibly, there could be discrep-
ancies between the agencies’ criteria and the Sound Science Act re-
quirement that greater weight be given to data that are ªeld-tested or
peer-reviewed.307 If the agencies’ standards were to focus on different
criteria, there very well could be a conºict between the Sound Science
Act requirement of using “ªeld data” and the ESA requirement of us-
ing the “best scientiªc data available.”308
Finally, one can make a strong argument that scientists, not legisla-
tors, should determine what constitutes the best science.309 By introduc-
ing congressional standards into the ESA’s scientiªc calculus, the
Sound Science Act arguably dilutes scientiªc integrity and reliability.310
B. Peer Review
Section 3 of the Sound Science Act would create a peer review
requirement for most ESA determinations.311 Again, FWS and NMFS
already have a joint policy that “incorporate[s] independent peer re-
view in listing and recovery activities.”312 Nevertheless, section 3 would
establish a list of independent scientiªc reviewers “qualiªed” to assess
agency actions.313 Any agency action—including species listing or de-
listing, recovery plan development, jeopardy ªndings for proposed
agency actions, and proposals for RPAs—would have to be reviewed
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by a random panel of three qualiªed reviewers before it could be-
come ªnal.314 The agency also would have to justify any decisions that
diverge from the reviewers’ recommendations.315
In the Klamath Basin, the suckers and coho are listed already, so
there would be no difªculty regarding the new peer review process for
listing these species.316 Any further critical habitat designations or
changes in species status between threatened, endangered, or even
de-listed, however, would be subject to the “peer review” process.317
Indeed, so too would be any attempt by FWS or NMFS to develop
conservation plans for the suckers or coho.318 The NRC Final Report
emphasized that creation of such plans was critical,319 but the Sound
Science Act would interject a layer of bureaucracy into that process.320
Agency decisions regarding endangered species already take con-
siderable time; the Sound Science Act would add three months for
the reviewers to make their recommendations for any major decision,
as well as whatever time it takes the agency to respond to them.321 This
problem could be exacerbated further if there is any difªculty in
ªnding three qualiªed, disinterested reviewers, potentially delaying
agency actions signiªcantly.322 After all, “there may be few (or no)
people in the world knowledgeable about some species and these spe-
cialists often have other duties and may not be available (or willing) to
serve governmental regulators.”323 Additionally, “unbiased scientists
may also be an issue if the listing or action being reviewed could in-
volve major economic factors in which the scientists have an inter-
est.”324 Academics with sufªcient scientiªc training also might be less
inclined to peer review for FWS or NMFS than they might be for a
prestigious group like the NRC.325
The peer review requirement of the Sound Science Act would ac-
complish little more than to make ªnal decisions more difªcult to
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come by. The requirement is particularly unhelpful given the “lack of
consensus typical of scientists in the early stages of exploring a complex
system.”326 Incomplete knowledge about an intricate system leads to
scientiªc uncertainty: scientists must introduce value judgments and
opinions in order to create useful conclusions.327 For example, irriga-
tors pointed to the NRC Interim Report as the ultimate harbinger of
sound, peer-reviewed science, while critics simultaneously published
peer-reviewed articles questioning the NRC’s political motivations and
oversimpliªcation of the issues.328 The difªculty is that all sides have a
scientiªc basis to support their arguments: “[I]t is always possible for a
proponent or opponent of a particular course of action to point to al-
ternative data or interpretations that support his or her point of
view.”329 Rather than politicizing decisions as relying only on “sound
science,” parties must accept that any ESA decision necessarily involves
signiªcant policy considerations and professional judgment.330
Since consensus is unlikely, the “peer review” requirement would
contribute little more than increased litigation.331 Agencies already
spread thin with backlogs of species that need to be listed or de-listed
would become mired in litigation defending every decision as sup-
ported by peer-reviewed, ªeld-gathered science.332
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C. Improved Recovery Planning
Section 4 of the Sound Science Act ªrst would require FWS and
NMFS to “actively solicit and consider information from the State
agency in each affected State.”333 This does not appear to be a
signiªcant requirement outside of the current process: the agencies
already have a joint policy that takes advantage of state agencies’ “sci-
entiªc data and valuable expertise” during prelisting, listing, consulta-
tion regarding critical habitat and BiOps, habitat conservation plan-
ning, and recovery planning.334
Section 4 also would substantially increase access to—and, conse-
quently, inºuence in—the scientiªc review process for “any person
who has sought authorization or funding from a Federal agency for
an action that is the subject of the consultation.”335 These individuals,
such as irrigators in the Klamath Basin, would submit information to
the agency regarding the effects of the proposed action and the avail-
ability of RPAs prior to the completion of the draft BiOp.336 They also
would have access to all information used by the agencies to develop
the draft BiOp and could submit comments on and challenges to the
draft BiOp prior to the release of the ªnal BiOp.337
Thus, any future FWS and NMFS determinations regarding the
suckers or coho would be subject to information requests and chal-
lenges by irrigators.338 Moreover, any agency decision that diverged
from the irrigators’ RPAs would have to be explained and justiªed.339
Requiring overburdened agencies to defend their decisions to inter-
ested parties would impose a signiªcant responsibility on those agen-
cies and invite litigation by unsatisªed parties.340
Moreover, the Sound Science Act does not provide this access to all
interested parties; rather, only to those “who ha[ve] sought authoriza-
tion or funding from a Federal agency for an action that is the subject
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of the consultation.”341 This means that while irrigators would have sub-
stantial access to and inºuence in the creation of NMFS and FWS
BiOps, downstream ªshermen, tribes, and others would not.342 The
downstream ªshermen certainly have an interest in any NMFS decision,
since Reclamation’s actions greatly affect the ªshing industry.343 Ac-
cording to the Paciªc Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, the
west coast’s largest organization of commercial ªshing families, declin-
ing salmon populations have resulted in losses of 4000 jobs and $80
million per year since 1992.344 The tribes similarly have interests in
agency decisions given their treaty rights for ªshing and the cultural
value they place on the suckers and salmon.345 Nevertheless, section 4
makes it clear that only those who have “sought authorization or fund-
ing from a Federal agency for an action that is the subject of the con-
sultation” have access,346 leaving other parties to wait on the sidelines
until decisions are made, and then to challenge them in court.
D. Abandonment of the Precautionary Principle?
In effect, the Sound Science Act is a large step away from the very
core of the ESA: the Precautionary Principle.
The Precautionary Principle asserts that parties should take
measures to protect public health and the environment,
even in the absence of clear, scientiªc evidence of harm. It
provides for two conditions. First, in the face of scientiªc un-
certainties, parties should refrain from actions that might
harm the environment, and, second, that the burden of
proof for assuring the safety of an action falls on those who
propose it.347
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Knowledge about species that are on the brink of extinction is
bound to be incomplete, and conclusions drawn from such imperfect
knowledge are bound to vary.348 Nevertheless, the remedy for this
failure always has been the ESA’s strong wording,349 and its require-
ment of “the best scientiªc . . . data available, not the best scientiªc
data possible.”350 The U.S. Supreme Court has taken Congress at its
word that combating extinction is of utmost importance.351
By requiring ªeld data and scientiªc peer review before species
can be listed or other determinations can be made, the Sound Sci-
ence Act delays ESA actions, and makes ªnal agency decisions more
difªcult to achieve. Rather than urging caution before implementing
potentially harmful activities, the Sound Science Act instead urges
caution before implementing the ESA.
Conclusion
Rather than contributing to real solutions for the Klamath Basin,
it is likely that the Sound Science Act would serve only as another tool
for political maneuvering. The past several years are replete with legal
and political tactics aimed at “winning.” Environmentalists sued suc-
cessfully in 2001 to block irrigation deliveries.352 The result was that,
in a year of drought—but not unprecedented drought—irrigators re-
ceived twenty-two percent of normal water ºows.353 The response,
backed by the NRC Interim Report and an administration seeking to
bolster the support of its conservative base,354 was full irrigation deliv-
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eries in 2002, contributing to a catastrophic ªsh kill.355 Again in 2003,
environmentalists and others succeeded in challenging Reclamation’s
long-term Project operations plan, though the court stopped short of
disallowing use of the plan through 2003.356
Every step in the controversy has embodied an all-or-nothing
strategy, each group seeking to obtain its full legal water claim.357 The
heart of the problem, stated by everyone but embraced by few, is that
there are too many legitimate rights to the water: simply put, the
“demand for water . . . exceeds the supply of water.”358 In light of that
reality and the basin’s history, it seems likely that the Sound Science
Act would contribute to the Klamath Basin’s opportunities for litiga-
tion rather than resolution.
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